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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1 
 Amici are law professors who focus on LGBT 
rights and antidiscrimination law in their scholarship 
and/or teaching. Kyle Velte is the author of several law 
review articles about the issues presented in this case, 
including a forthcoming article on which this brief is 
based.2 
--------------------------------- ♦ --------------------------------- 
 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 For 150 years, our country has grappled with the 
tension between its commitment to antidiscrimina-
tion principles, grounded in the Reconstruction 
Amendments, and its commitment to religious liberty, 
 
 1 Respondents have filed blanket consents to the filing of 
amicus briefs. Amici requested and received consent from Peti-
tioners and Intervenors. Counsel for a party has not authored the 
brief in whole or in part; nor has such counsel or a party made a 
monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or sub-
mission of the brief. 
 2 See Kyle C. Velte, Restoring the Race Analogy in LGBT Re-
ligious Exemption Cases, 42 CARDOZO L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 
2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3549952; 
see also Kyle C. Velte, Why the Religious Right Can’t Have Its 
(Straight Wedding) Cake and Eat It Too: Breaking the Preserva-
tion-Through-Transformation Dynamic in Masterpiece Cakeshop 
v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 36 L. & INEQ. 67 (2018); 
Kyle C. Velte, Fueling the Terrorist Fires with the First Amend-
ment: Religious Freedom, the Anti-LGBT Right, and Interest Con-
vergence Theory, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 1109 (2017); Kyle C. Velte, 
All Fall Down: A Comprehensive Approach to Defeating the Reli-
gious Right’s Challenge to Anti-Discrimination Statutes, 49 CONN. 
L. REV. 1 (2016). 
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grounded in the First Amendment.3 The national 
reckoning with requests for religious exemptions from 
antidiscrimination laws concerning race is now settled. 
From those legal battles emerged “time-tested, reason-
able, and workable”4 balances. But this Court has not 
yet settled how religiously-grounded requests for ex-
emptions from antidiscrimination laws concerning 
sexual orientation apply to those laws, as this Court’s 
treatment of sexual orientation under the Constitu-
tion, like those antidiscrimination laws themselves, 
are of recent vintage. Yet, this Court’s prior resolution 
of claims for religious exemptions from race antidis-
crimination laws provide this Court a “reasonable, and 
workable” resolution of claims for religious exemptions 
from sexual orientation antidiscrimination laws. 
 This brief explains how this Court’s treatment of 
race guides it to fashion the best decision—one that 
avoids normative critiques of who is supposedly virtu-
ous or prejudiced. Constitutional law has no business 
singling out and assessing the normative or moral 
worthiness of religious beliefs vis-à-vis objections to 
antidiscrimination law if it does not also assess the 
normative or moral worthiness of other, non-religious 
objections to antidiscrimination law. Moreover, this 
 
 3 See Carlos A. Ball, Against LGBT Exceptionalism in Reli-
gious Exemptions from Antidiscrimination Obligations, 31 J. C.R. 
& ECON. DEV. 233, 237–38 (2018); see also Masterpiece Cakeshop, 
Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1724 (2018); 
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623–24 (1984); Newman v. 
Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 n.5 (1968) (per cu-
riam). 
 4 Ball, supra note 3, at 238. 
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Court’s teachings in cases about reconciling free exer-
cise with antidiscrimination principles vis-à-vis race 
should lead to a harmonious, stable, and consistent 
doctrinal framework. 
 The Court’s recent teachings in this vein provide 
an analytic framework for this case. Here, Philadel-
phia’s Catholic Social Services (“CSS”) claims a reli-
gious exemption from the Philadelphia Fair Practices 
Ordinance (“FPO”), which requires social service 
agencies contracting with it to serve adopting couples 
without discrimination, including same-sex couples. In 
Masterpiece Cakeshop,5 this Court left open the ques-
tion of whether an analogy to race is appropriate in re-
ligious exemption cases involving sexual orientation. 
The race analogy in sexual orientation cases proceeds 
as follows: advocates and judges widely agree that 
courts should, and would, reject a religious exemption 
claim by a public accommodation—such as a wedding 
vendor or, as here, a foster care agency—seeking to 
turn away an African-American or interracial couple 
based on the public accommodation’s religious beliefs 
that Blacks are inferior to whites or that the races 
should not mix.6 Analogizing to race means that courts 
should likewise reject CSS’s religious exemption 
 
 5 138 S. Ct. at 1732 (reversing on the basis that the Colorado 
Civil Rights Commission’s treatment of baker was inconsistent 
with the neutrality the Free Exercise Clause requires). 
 6 See Transcript of Oral argument at 21:16–22:9, Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111) [hereinafter Transcript]. 
By citing Piggie Park in the majority decision, the Court suggests 
that the race analogy is proper in sexual orientation religious ex-
emption cases. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1727. 
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claims seeking to turn away same-sex couples based on 
their religious beliefs about marriage. 
 Masterpiece Cakeshop cited this Court’s 1968 de-
cision in Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc.,7 thus 
applying the race analogy to sexual orientation cases.8 
In the context of resolving the question of the proper 
standard for an award of attorneys’ fees under the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Piggie Park affirmed the lower 
courts’ rejection of a religious exemption claim in the 
context of race discrimination.9 Because today’s ex-
emption seekers make similar claims vis-à-vis sexual 
orientation discrimination, LGBT-rights advocates ar-
gue that Piggie Park resolves the question of religious 
exemptions against exemption seekers. 
 Yet today’s exemption seekers reject use of the 
race analogy and the applicability of Piggie Park for at 
least two reasons. The first is based on a normative ar-
gument: The vendors of the 1960s who relied on their 
religious beliefs to discriminate based on race were 
racists, whereas today’s exemption seekers are people 
of faith asserting honorable and sincere religious be-
liefs. Because they are not bigots and the long-ago 
vendors in Piggie Park were, they argue that the race 
analogy must fail. Otherwise, they contend, today’s 
 
 7 390 U.S. 400 (1968). 
 8 138 S. Ct. at 1727. 
 9 390 U.S. at 402 n.5. 
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exemption seekers will be unfairly branded as bigots.10 
Second, today’s exemption seekers contend that the 
race analogy fails because race discrimination receives 
strict scrutiny, whereas this Court has not applied that 
standard to sexual orientation discrimination.11 
 These objections to the race analogy fail as a mat-
ter of historical and contemporary fact, and as a matter 
of law. The first objection fails because the race analogy 
and the honorableness of today’s exemption seekers 
are not mutually exclusive. Opposition to religious ex-
emptions need not entail any argument that exemp-
tion seekers are acting dishonorably or with animus, 
nor rest on the doctrine of Romer v. Evans12 or United 
States v. Windsor,13 which struck down laws because 
they rested on anti-LGBT animus. To understand why 
the race analogy need not be a normative rebuke to 
today’s exemption seekers, it is important to reap-
praise the relevant legal and factual premises. Below, 
amici frame this dispute constructively and neutrally, 
arguing that (1) exemption seekers’ First Amendment 
claims fail as a matter of well-established law, regard-
less of the normative characterization of the asserted 
 
 
 10 See LINDA C. MCCLAIN, WHO’S THE BIGOT?: LEARNING 
FROM CONFLICTS OVER MARRIAGE AND CIVIL RIGHTS LAW 3 (2020) 
[hereinafter MCCLAIN, WHO’S THE BIGOT?]. 
 11 The Court’s recent decision in Bostock v. Clayton County, 
140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020), strongly suggests that sexual orientation 
merits intermediate scrutiny, as does sex discrimination. See in-
fra Part II. 
 12 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 13 570 U.S. 744 (2013). 
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religious beliefs, and not because of anything norma-
tively flawed about them; (2) the exemption seekers of 
the 1960s were viewed as honorable and sincere by 
courts and the public alike; and (3) courts must not 
look behind the asserted religious belief to validate or 
critique it, but must instead accept the asserted belief 
at face value. 
 From these premises, the normative characteriza-
tion of the asserted religious belief—whether as animus-
driven and framed as prejudiced, or as honorable as 
validating important and worthy norms—is irrelevant 
when assessing the propriety of the race analogy. In-
stead, the correct constitutional analysis begins with 
the premise that exemption seekers like CSS need not 
be viewed as inflected with animus or bigotry and 
that the race analogy and Piggie Park are properly 
used to analyze their claims. Similarly, the second ob-
jection—concerning strict scrutiny—fails because it is 
based on a fundamental misunderstanding of two 
things that are not commensurate: the relationship 
between the equal protection tiers of scrutiny, on one 
hand, and claims for religious exemptions from anti-
discrimination law, on the other. Revealing these con-
ceptual traps allows this Court to develop sounder and 
more coherent and consistent doctrine. 
--------------------------------- ♦ --------------------------------- 
 
ARGUMENT 
 Supporters of today’s religious exemptions seekers 
argue that race is different from sexual orientation, 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3691160
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rendering the race analogy and Piggie Park inappo-
site.14 Their two central arguments against the race 
analogy fail, as explained below. 
 
I. Piggie Park Is Analogous: Honorable Oppo-
sition v. Explicit Bigotry 
A. Newman v. Piggie Park 
 Piggie Park is at the heart of the dispute over the 
race analogy in the sexual orientation discrimination 
religious exemption cases. In 1964, soon after the Civil 
Rights Act (CRA) became law, African-Americans in 
South Carolina brought a class action alleging that the 
Piggie Park chain of BBQ restaurants refused them 
service on the same terms as white customers.15 The 
defendants—the corporate entity of Piggie Park Enter-
prises, Inc., and its principal shareholder and manager, 
 
 14 See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, What Same-Sex-Marriage and 
Religious-Liberty Claims Have in Common, 5 Nw. J.L. & SOC. 
POL’Y 206, 235 (2010); Patrick J. Borchers, Baker v. General 
Motors: Implications for Interjurisdictional Recognition of Non-
Traditional Marriages, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 147, 151–52 (1998); 
Robert H. Bork, The Judge’s Role in Law and Culture, 1 AVE MA-
RIA L. Rev. 19, 26 (2003); David Orgon Coolidge, Playing the Lov-
ing Card: Same-Sex Marriage and the Politics of Analogy, 12 BYU 
J. Pub. L. 201, 204 (1998); Dale M. Schowengerdt, Note, Defend-
ing Marriage: A Litigation Strategy to Oppose Same-Sex “Mar-
riage”, 14 REGENT U.L. REV. 487, 491–92 (2002); Lynn D. Wardle, 
A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Claims for Same-Sex Mar-
riage, 1996 BYU L. REV. 1, 75–82 (1996); see also Transcript, su-
pra note 6, at 31:23–33:11. 
 15 Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 256 F. Supp. 941, 
943–44 (D.S.C. 1966), rev’d, 377 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1967), aff ’d, 
390 U.S. 400 (1968) (per curiam). 
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Maurice Bessinger—argued that they were exempt 
from complying with the CRA because it violated Bes-
singer’s First Amendment right to freedom of religion 
because his faith “ ‘compel[led] him to oppose any inte-
gration of the races whatever.’ ”16 In a four-paragraph 
per curiam decision, this Court rejected a subjective 
standard for attorney fees under the CRA.17 In a foot-
note, the Court noted that, on remand, an award of at-
torney fees to the plaintiffs would be proper: “Indeed, 
this is not . . . even a borderline case, for the respond-
ents interposed defenses so patently frivolous that a 
denial of counsel fees to the petitioners would be man-
ifestly inequitable.”18 The Court pointed to the defend-
ants’ argument that the CRA “was invalid because it 
‘contravenes the will of God’ and constitutes an inter-
ference with the ‘free exercise of the Defendant’s reli-
gion’ ” as an example of a “patently frivolous” defense 
properly subject to an award of attorney fees.19 
 
B. Piggie Park Applies to Today’s Religious 
Exemption Cases 
 Today’s exemption seekers argue what while the 
religious argument asserted in Piggie Park was 
deemed “frivolous,”20 the religious beliefs of public 
 
 16 Id.at 944. 
 17 Piggie Park, 390 U.S. at 401. 
 18 Id. at 402 n.5. 
 19 Id. (quoting Piggie Park, 377 F.2d 433 at 437–38 (Winter, 
J., concurring)). 
 20 Piggie Park, 377 F.2d at 437 (Winters, J., concurring). 
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accommodation such as CSS are just the opposite—
sincerely held.21 At the Masterpiece Cakeshop oral ar-
gument, Chief Justice Roberts addressed this particu-
lar concern: 
[T]he racial analogy obviously is very compel-
ling, but when the Court upheld same-sex 
marriage in Obergefell, it went out of its way 
to talk about the decent and honorable people 
who may have opposing views. 
And to immediately lump them in the same 
group as people who are opposed to equality 
in relations with respect to race, I’m not sure 
that takes full account of that—of that con-
cept in the Obergefell decision.22 
 Today’s exemption seekers understandably seek 
to elevate this concern into an analytic frame that can 
avoid the race analogy. They scaffold their distinction 
of Piggie Park with language from Obergefell: “Many 
who deem same-sex marriage to be wrong reach that 
conclusion based on decent and honorable religious or 
philosophical premises, and neither they nor their be-
liefs are disparaged here.”23 Overlaying this language 
 
 21 See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Christian Business Own-
ers Supporting Religious Freedom in Support of Petitioners at 
30–31, Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 
S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111), 2017 WL 4005666, at *30–31; see 
also MCCLAIN, WHO’S THE BIGOT?, supra note 10, at 196–98; 
Douglas NeJaime, Bigotry in Time: Race, Sexual Orientation, and 
Gender, 99 B.U. L. REV. 2651, 2655 (2019). 
 22 Transcript, supra note 6, 75:17-76:5.–74:3. 
 23 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015); see 
also Douglas NeJaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars:  
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from Obergefell upon the distinction they argue from 
Piggie Park’s “patently frivolous” finding, today’s ex-
emption seekers argue that it is unfair and offensive 
to compare them to the racist vendors who claimed re-
ligious exemptions from the CRA.24 They insist that 
“race is different . . . because essentially all religious 
actors who believe it is proper to make racial distinc-
tions always act in bad faith (i.e., they are racists). On 
the other hand, it is argued, many of those who, on con-
science grounds, believe it is proper to make distinc-
tions on the basis of sexual orientation, in particular 
when it comes to marriage, act in good faith (i.e., they 
are not homophobic).”25 
 
Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 
YALE L.J. 2516, 2558–66 (2015). 
 24 See, e.g., Ryan T. Anderson, Disagreement Is Not Always 
Discrimination: Masterpiece Cakeshop and the Analogy to Inter-
racial Marriage, 16 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 123, 134 (2018); 
Linda C. McClain, The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and “Legislating 
Morality”: On Conscience, Prejudice, and Whether “Stateways” 
can Change “Folkways,” 95 B.U. L. REV. 891, 894–95 (2015) [here-
inafter McClain, Stateways]. 
 25 Ball, supra note 3, at 239–40. For example, Robin Wilson 
contends that “[t]he religious and moral convictions that motivate 
objectors to refuse to facilitate same-sex marriage simply cannot 
be marshaled to justify racial discrimination.” Robin Fretwell 
Wilson, Matters of Conscience: Lessons for Same-Sex Marriage 
from the Healthcare Context in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELI-
GIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS 101 (Douglas Laycock et al. 
eds., 2008). Lynn Wardle and Lincoln Oliphant contend that ac-
cepting the race analogy “means that those who oppose same-sex 
marriage are, like those who opposed inter-racial marriage, 
simply bigots.” Lynn D. Wardle & Lincoln C. Oliphant, In Praise 
of Loving: Reflections on the “Loving Analogy” for Same-Sex 
Marriage, 51 HOW. L.J. 117, 151 (2007). 
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 While the exemption seekers understandably dis-
claim animus, they seek to elevate these normative dis-
tinctions grounded in subjective moral judgments to a 
legal principle that excludes use of the race analogy. 
Deeper analysis of the bigoted versus honorable dis-
tinction, however, disrupts any potential persuasive 
work that might be accomplished with the exemption 
seekers’ argument. 
 As an initial matter, it is important to address the 
exemption seekers’ reliance on the Court’s statement 
in Obergefell; considering that statement in context 
weakens its power as scaffolding. That portion of the 
opinion was immediately followed by another, con-
trasting statement that privileges and respects a dif-
ferent, pro-equality view: “But when that sincere, 
personal opposition becomes enacted law and public 
policy, the necessary consequence is to put the impri-
matur of the State itself on an exclusion that soon de-
means or stigmatizes those whose own liberty is then 
denied.”26 
 
1. The Exemption Seekers of the 1960s 
Were Not Considered Fringe or Prej-
udiced 
 The distinction between “bigoted” and “honorable” 
citizens in this context is simplistic and wrong as a 
matter of historical fact regarding how American 
 
 26 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602. 
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society viewed these questions 50 years ago.27 Oppo-
nents of the CRA made religiously-grounded argu-
ments similar to the arguments of today’s exemption 
seekers; moreover, their reliance on their faith was 
mainstream, not fringe.28 Importantly, similar to to-
day’s exemption seekers, the religious objectors to the 
CRA bristled when they were characterized as bigots; 
they, too, considered their religiously-based opposition 
to the CRA honorable, right, and just.29 As Michael 
Kent Curtis notes: 
Slavery, racial discrimination and segrega-
tion, and opposition to women’s rights were 
all supported by strong religious arguments 
bolstered by citations to the Bible. As scholarly 
work has shown, these religious views were 
deeply held by many people. That Professor 
[Robin Fretwell] Wilson finds it impossible to 
marshal religious arguments for segregation 
is, to a great degree, a tribute to the success of 
the Civil Rights Movement and civil rights 
laws, generally without exemptions for reli-
gious objectors. 
 
 27 See Shannon Gilreath & Arley Ward, Same-Sex Marriage, 
Religious Accommodation, and the Race Analogy, 41 VT. L. REV. 
237, 261, 278 (2016). 
 28 MCCLAIN, WHO’S THE BIGOT?, supra note 10, at 105, 126. 
 29 McClain, Stateways, supra note 24, at 894–95; MCCLAIN, 
WHO’S THE BIGOT?, supra note 10, at 8, 117; Randall Kennedy, 
Marriage and the Struggle for Gay, Lesbian, and Black Libera-
tion, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 781, 791 (2005); James M. Oleske, Jr., 
The Evolution of Accommodations: Comparing the Unequal Treat-
ment of Religious Objections to Interracial and Same-Sex Mar-
riages, 50 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 107–08 (2015). 
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Not only could religious arguments for segre-
gation be marshaled, they were marshaled.30 
It was not just clergy who opposed integration on reli-
gious grounds; leading Senators from both sides of the 
aisle, including Robert Byrd and Strom Thurmond 
made such arguments on the Senate floor and their 
sentiments were shared by “educators, ‘housewives, 
sorority sisters, and Rotarians. . . .’ ”31 In 1963, then-
President Truman stated that “he did not believe white 
persons should marry Negroes . . . [and] that racial 
intermarriage ran counter to teachings of the Bible.”32 
 Fairly understood, the 1960s exemption seekers 
espoused views which, though viewed by most people 
today as offensive, were endorsed by leaders of both 
major political parties, and which enjoyed a regretta-
ble breadth of acceptance and respect that Americans 
today might prefer to forget.33 The “complete lack of . . . 
deference” given to opponents of interracial marriage 
in the 1960s and the relatively greater deference given 
 
 30 Michael Kent Curtis, A Unique Religious Exemption from 
Antidiscrimination Laws in the Case of Gays? Putting the Call for 
Those Who Discriminate Against Married or Marrying Gays in 
Context, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 173, 187–88 (2012) (citations 
omitted); see also MCCLAIN, WHO’S THE BIGOT?, supra note 10, at 
126, 203. 
 31 Gilreath & Ward, supra note 27, at 262 (alteration in orig-
inal) (citations omitted). 
 32 Oleske, supra note 29, at 100 (quoting Truman Opposes 
Biracial Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1963, p. 30). 
 33 See MCCLAIN, WHO’S THE BIGOT?, supra note 10, at 126 
(noting that “religious beliefs about segregation were not ‘fringe’ 
in the mid-1960s and were sincerely and widely held”). 
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to today’s objectors to same-sex marriage “cannot be 
explained by the extent of contemporary societal sup-
port of the respective practices.”34 Thus, those who in 
the 1960s opposed racial equality and integration “are 
entitled to the same presumption of sincerity as cur-
rent opponents of gay equality. Many believed the reli-
gious argument against integration and interracial 
marriage, just as many people believe the religious ar-
guments against gay equality and liberty.”35 
 
2. Courts Need Not Assess the Norma-
tive Character of Religious Beliefs 
 Both opponents of the CRA in the 1960s and to-
day’s exemption seekers ground their positions in the 
 
 34 Olekse, supra note 29, at 102, 107 (“According to Gallup, 
public support of interracial marriage in the 1950s and 1960s 
was considerably lower than support for same-sex marriage in 
the 1990s and 2000s.”) (citing Jeffrey M. Jones, Record-High 86% 
Approve of Black-White Marriages, GALLUP (Sept. 12, 2011), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/149390/record-high-approve-black-
white-marriages.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/HN22-D5J2 
(reporting that public approval of interracial marriage was at just 
4% in 1958 and 20% in 1968), in comparison with Frank Newport, 
For First Time, Majority of Americans Favor Legal Gay Marriage, 
GALLUP (May 20, 2011), http:// www.gallup.com/poll/147662/first-
time-majority-americans-favor-legal-gay-marriage.aspx, archived 
at http://perma.cc/Y533-7CNC (reporting that support for same-
sex marriage was 27% in 1996, 42% in 2004, and 53% in 2011)). 
 35 Curtis, supra note 30, at 191–92; see also Ball, supra note 
3, at 241–42; Margaret M. Russell, Lesbian, Gay and Bisexual 
Rights and “The Civil Rights Agenda”, 1 AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y REP. 
33, 44 (1994); Mark Strasser, Public Policy, Same-Sex Marriage, 
and Exemptions for Matters of Conscience, 12 FLA. COASTAL L. 
REV. 135, 139–40 (2010). 
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same source: their faith.36 The normative characteriza-
tions of exemption seekers’ reasons for seeking a reli-
gious exemption, whether cast as prejudiced or 
honorable, is inconsequential because courts often take 
at face value sincerely held religious beliefs, and do so 
without attaching normative judgments as to whether 
the asserted belief is “prejudiced” or “honorable.”37 
 This approach is correct on many levels. As a nor-
mative, pragmatic matter, such determinations are 
beyond judicial competence, thus rendering courts “ill-
equipped” to make such inquiries.38 And as a legal 
matter, courts decline to look behind a sincerely held 
religious belief.39 As a result, “courts have been reluc-
tant to interpret theologies . . . because [they] lack 
competence on such matters and because they must 
guarantee government neutrality with respect to reli-
gions.”40 Simply put, “[c]ourts are not arbiters of 
 
 36 See Curtis, supra note 30, at 178; Kennedy, supra note 29, 
at 783; McClain, Stateways, supra note 24, at 916–18. 
 37 See Paul Baker, Note, Religious Exemptions and the Voca-
tional Dimension of Work, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 169, 171 (2019). 
 38 Samuel J. Levine, Rethinking the Supreme Court’s Hands-
Off Approach to Questions of Religious Practice and Belief, 25 
FORDHAM URB. L. J. 85, 86 (1997) (citation omitted). 
 39 Id. at 86 n.3 (citing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 
n.2 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring) and County of Allegheny v. 
ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 678 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) and Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery, 485 
U.S. 439, 457–58 (1987)). 
 40 Nelson Tebbe, Reply: Conscience and Equality, 31 J. C.R. 
& ECON. DEV. 1, 33 (2018). 
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scriptural interpretation.”41 This has been true in reli-
gious exemption cases involving sexual orientation 
discrimination as well as cases involving race-based 
discrimination.42 
 It would be problematic to try to distinguish be-
tween religious grounds for a sexual orientation ex-
emption and one for a racial exemption because 
attempts to make those distinctions “contain unavoid-
able assessments of the reasonableness of the two sets 
of religious views.”43 Attempts to distinguish between 
these two positions “fail from the beginning because 
they are grounded in the notion that some religious 
views are more reasonable than others.”44 
 This “reluctance of courts to second guess an indi-
vidual’s religious beliefs”45 shows the strength of the 
race analogy because it insulates the religious beliefs 
of exemption seekers from normative characterization 
by the law as either “prejudiced” or “honorable.”46 Be-
cause courts must not look behind the “correctness” of 
sincerely held asserted religious beliefs, they must 
likewise reject the claim by exemption seekers that 
courts can classify religious beliefs as “honorable” or 
 
 41 Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Indiana Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 
U.S. 707, 716 (1981). 
 42 See MCCLAIN, WHO’S THE BIGOT?, supra note 10, at 188. 
 43 Ball, supra note 3, at 240. 
 44 Id. at 241. 
 45 Baker, supra note 37, at 199. 
 46 See MCCLAIN, WHO’S THE BIGOT?, supra note 10, at 196 (“A 
court does not inquire into whether such sincere religious beliefs 
are reasonable or mistaken.”). 
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“bigoted,” and then make substantive determinations 
on claims for religious exemptions based on such im-
permissible normative characterizations. Today’s ex-
emption seekers would improperly “require[ ] the state 
to leave its perch of neutrality among religions because 
the position involves an assessment of which claims 
of conscience are correct.”47 As such, “the suggestion 
that the same [religiously-based] arguments cannot 
be offered against recognizing the different kinds of 
marriages [interracial or same-sex] is at best irrele-
vant.”48 
 Thus, even if it is factually true that public accom-
modation like CSS “who turn their backs on same sex 
marriage on religious grounds have no evil in their 
hearts, in the overwhelming majority of cases,”49 that 
fact would not be relevant given the plain language of 
the FPO proscribing discriminatory conduct based on 
race or sexual orientation without any hierarchy.50 
Thus, the debate over the intentions of today’s exemp-
tion seekers is a detour from the merits of the legal 
questions and a distraction from meaningful consider-
ation of the race analogy and the applicability of Piggie 
Park. 
 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id.; see also Strasser, supra note 35, at 141. 
 49 Lawrence G. Sager & Nelson Tebbe, The Reality Principle, 
34 CONST. COMMENT. 171, 189 (2019). 
 50 MCCLAIN, WHO’S THE BIGOT?, supra note 10, at 190. No-
tably, the FPO regulates only conduct, not belief. 
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 Indeed, this Court’s obligation to accept CSS’s re-
ligious beliefs without judgments as to their correct-
ness or reasonableness defeats arguments that Piggie 
Park is distinguishable. When this Court agreed with 
the lower court’s description of the BBQ joint owner’s 
defense based on his religious belief as “patently frivo-
lous,”51 it was not making a normative judgment about 
the content of that belief.52 That type of moral and nor-
mative characterization of a litigant’s religious belief 
is outside the competence of judges and unconstitu-
tional under the First Amendment. This Court might 
have been commenting on the notion that a business 
entity could hold a religious belief, something foreign 
to 1960s Free Exercise jurisprudence,53 but which has 
recently been recognized by this Court in Burwell v. 
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,54 under which “courts would 
be compelled to entertain the [BBQ] chain’s claim for 
exemption.”55 Or the Court might well have been com-
menting that a religious objection as a defense to the 
nondiscrimination law challenged there was patently 
frivolous. In any event, neither the Fourth Circuit nor 
this Court expressed a judgment about the correctness 
of the religious belief in Piggie Park. As such, Piggie 
 
 51 Piggie Park, 377 F.2d at 437 (Winter, J., concurring). 
 52 See Elizabeth Sepper, Free Exercise Lochnerism, 115 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1453, 1517 (2015) [hereinafter Sepper, Lochnerism]. 
 53 See id. 
 54 573 U.S. 682, 707 (2014). 
 55 Sepper, Lochnerism, supra note 52, at 1517; see also Eliz-
abeth Sepper, Gays in the Moralized Marketplace, 7 ALA. C.R. & 
C.L. L. REV. 129, 130, 133–36 (2015) (citing Piggie Park, 390 U.S. 
at 402 n.5 and United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982)). 
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Park cannot be distinguished as involving an incorrect 
or improper religious belief, and clearly not by a liti-
gant making the constitutionally irrelevant argument 
that its religious belief is more virtuous than other be-
liefs to which it could be compared. 
 Accordingly, while today’s exemption seekers may 
“bristle at the notion that religiously-based resistance 
to racial integration is of any relevance to present-day 
controversies[,]”56 whether they are similar or dissimi-
lar to the opponents of the CRA in the 1960s is irrele-
vant. The fact that both groups base their claims on 
religious beliefs is the relevant comparison, making 
Piggie Park and the race analogy applicable here, as 
Masterpiece Cakeshop recognized.57 It is thus im-
portant to emphasize that “the mere step of drawing 
analogies between past and present forms of discrimi-
nation to point out how, over time, new insights and 
evolving understandings have led to recognition that 
such treatment is unjustified”—as is done when citing 
Piggie Park in this case—“is not a charge of bigotry.”58 
It is equally important to stress that when the City of 
Philadelphia compares the religious exemption sought 
here by CSS to race discrimination, this comparison 
should be not be treated as shorthand for anti-religion 
 
 56 McClain, Stateways, supra note 24, at 925. 
 57 Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1727. 
 58 MCCLAIN, WHO’S THE BIGOT?, supra note 10, at 209; see 
also id. at 201 (“[O]ne can concede religious sincerity while up-
holding the legitimacy of state anti-discrimination laws.”). 
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hostility by the City—a point the Court’s citation to 
Piggie Park in Masterpiece Cakeshop underscores.59 
 
II. Equal Protection Tiers of Scrutiny are Irrel-
evant to the Question of Religious Exemp-
tions from Antidiscrimination Laws 
 Although the sexual orientation religious exemp-
tion cases involve statutory protections, today’s exemp-
tion seekers invoke the constitutional tiers of scrutiny 
to try to persuade courts to reject the race analogy. For 
example, in briefs and argument in Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, the baker and his amici supported their 
general argument that race differs from sexual orien-
tation by arguing that race receives strict scrutiny 
while sexual orientation receives rational basis re-
view.60 Counsel for the baker made a similar claim at 
 
 59 Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1727 (“[W]hile . . . re-
ligious and philosophical objections are protected, it is a general 
rule that such objections do not allow business owners and other 
actors in the economy and in society to deny protected persons 
equal access to goods and services under a neutral and generally 
applicable public accommodations law.”). 
 60 See Reply Brief for Petitioner at 15, Masterpiece Cakeshop 
v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111), 
2017 WL 5644420, at *15; Transcript, supra note 6, at 20:8–21:20, 
22:1–23:6; see also Brief for Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights 
Under Law, Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund, 
Center for Constitutional Rights, Color of Change, the Leadership 
Conference of Civil and Human Rights, National Action Network, 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Na-
tional Urban League and Southern Poverty Law Center as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Respondents at 18, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 
Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-
111), 2017 WL 5127306, at *18 [hereinafter Brief for Lawyers’  
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the Masterpiece Cakeshop oral argument.61 Similarly, 
scholars supporting religious exemptions contend 
that the race analogy improperly compares “apples 
and oranges”—the notion that the racial civil rights 
movement, which arose from slavery, is simply not 
 
 
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law]. The United States, ap-
pearing as amici in support of the baker, argued that “laws tar-
geting race-based discrimination may survive heightened First 
Amendment scrutiny” because “a State’s ‘fundamental, overrid-
ing interest’ in eliminating private racial discrimination . . . may 
justify even those applications of a public accommodation law 
that infringe on First Amendment freedoms.” Brief for the United 
States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 32, Master-
piece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 
(2018) (No. 16-111), 2017 WL 4004530, at *32 (citation omitted). 
The United States then argued that that same public accommo-
dation law should face a different fate when sexual orientation 
discrimination is at issue: “The Court has not similarly held that 
classifications based on sexual orientation are subject to strict 
scrutiny or that eradicating private individuals’ opposition to 
same-sex marriage is a uniquely compelling interest.” Id. 
 61 In response to Justice Kagan’s question, “[s]ame case or 
not the same case, if your client instead objected to an interracial 
marriage?”, counsel for the baker responded: “I think race is dif-
ferent for two reasons: one, we know that that objection would be 
based to who the person is, rather than what the message is. And, 
second, even if that were not the case, the Court could find a com-
pelling interest in the race inquiry. . . .” Transcript, supra note 6, 
at 22:1–23:6. In response to Justice Sotomayor’s question, “is your 
theory that . . . public accommodation laws cannot trump free 
speech or free-exercise claims in protecting against race discrim-
ination?”, the baker’s attorney responded: “That is not my theory. 
That would be an objection to the person and the Court may find 
a compelling interest in that.” Id. at 21:12–20. These references 
to a compelling interest are, of course, references to the argument 
that race gets strict scrutiny and, according to the argument, sex-
ual orientation does not. 
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comparable to the LGBT-rights movement, as illus-
trated by what they contend are differing levels of 
equal protection scrutiny.62 
 Significantly, this Court has not yet determined 
the level of equal protection scrutiny afforded to sexual 
orientation, although its recent decision in Bostock v. 
Clayton County suggests that sexual orientation, like 
sex, is subject to intermediate scrutiny.63 Moreover, the 
Ninth Circuit and Second Circuit have held that sex-
ual orientation is subject to heightened scrutiny.64 Yet 
putting all of that aside, Petitioners’ argument none-
theless fails. 
 As an initial matter, this argument is out of place 
where the statute at issue—a public accommodation 
law—does not classify based on race, or on any pro-
tected classification. The law declares that the prohib-
ited conduct—discrimination in the marketplace—is 
prohibited vis-à-vis all protected individuals (race, sex, 
religion, sexual orientation, etc.); it is a neutral law of 
general applicability that even-handedly applies to all 
places of public accommodation. Moreover, CSS does 
not challenge the FPO under the Equal Protection 
Clause, the provision most readily associated with the 
 
 62 Wardle & Oliphant, supra note 25, at 144–45. 
 63 See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1778 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 64 E.g., Karnoski v. Trump, 926 F.3d 1180, 1200–01 (9th Cir. 
2019); Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 468 (9th Cir. 2014); 
SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs, 740 F.3d 471, 480–81 
(9th Cir. 2014); Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 180–85 
(2d Cir. 2012), aff ’d, 570 U.S. 744 (2013). 
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argument that “race gets strict scrutiny, but sexual ori-
entation gets rational basis.” 
 Exemption seekers’ arguments on this front take 
two forms. First, because they contend sexual orienta-
tion should be subject to rational basis review,65 cities 
like Philadelphia do not have a compelling interest in 
protecting against sexual orientation discrimination in 
the marketplace. In contrast, the argument proceeds, 
because race gets strict scrutiny, cities like Philadel-
phia do have a compelling interest in protecting 
against racial discrimination in the marketplace.66 
 This argument turns antidiscrimination law on its 
head and contradicts this Court’s precedent declaring 
that protecting against discrimination in public accom-
modation is a compelling state interest.67 As a result, 
when a statute’s plain language declares that both race 
and sexual orientation are deserving of the protection 
of a public accommodation law, there is necessarily a 
compelling state interest in supporting every applica-
tion of the antidiscrimination statute. 
 
 65 But see Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1743 (holding that sexual 
orientation discrimination is sex discrimination under Title VII); 
id. at 1783 (Alito, J., dissenting); Karnoski, 926 F.3d at 1200–01; 
Latta, 771 F.3d at 468; SmithKline Beecham Corp., 740 F.3d at 
480–81; Windsor, 99 F.3d at 180–85. 
 66 See Wardle & Oliphant, supra note 25, at 144–45. 
 67 See Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 624 (noting that “eliminating dis-
crimination and assuring its citizens equal access to publicly 
available goods and services . . . plainly serves compelling state 
interests of the highest order.”). 
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 Masterpiece Cakeshop suggests that exemption 
seekers’ argument concerning the level of scrutiny 
should not carry the day. The Court wrote that it was 
“unexceptional” that states can protect LGBT people 
through public accommodation law, as Colorado did 
there.68 The Court’s “matter-of-fact” assessment of 
state antidiscrimination laws “is an important im-
plicit rejection of . . . the argument that . . . the state’s 
interest in prohibiting race discrimination is far more 
compelling then addressing other forms of discrimina-
tion[,]” such as sexual orientation discrimination.69 
 Moreover, Bostock’s holding that sexual orienta-
tion discrimination is per se sex discrimination under 
Title VII70 has “far-reaching consequences” that spill 
over into constitutional law.71 Sex-based discrimina-
tion is subject to intermediate scrutiny under the 
Equal Protection Clause.72 Thus, “[b]y equating dis-
crimination because of sexual orientation or gender 
identity with discrimination because of sex, the Court’s 
decision will be cited as a ground for subjecting all 
three forms of discrimination to the same exacting 
 
 68 138 S. Ct. at 1728. 
 69 MCCLAIN, WHO’S THE BIGOT?, supra note 10, at 207; see 
also Romer, 517 U.S. at 627–28 (noting with approval “modern 
anti-discrimination laws” that “go[ ] well beyond the entities cov-
ered by the common law” by “enumerating the groups or persons 
within their ambit of protection”—such as LGBT people—“to 
make the duty not to discriminate concrete and to provide guid-
ance for those who must comply.”). 
 70 Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1742. 
 71 Id. at 1778 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 72 See, e.g., U.S. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532–34 (1996). 
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standard of review.”73 The consequence of having the 
same Equal Protection standard for sexual orientation 
and sex defeats exemption seekers’ argument that race 
is inapposite because race gets strict scrutiny while 
sexual orientation only gets rational basis review. 
 In fact, in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, the 
Court held that a public accommodation law that pro-
tected against sex discrimination served a compelling 
state interest, even though sex-based classifications 
received only intermediate constitutional scrutiny.74 
After Bostock, that same conclusion should result with 
regard to public accommodation laws that protect 
against sexual orientation discrimination. Moreover, 
the Court has suggested that a state legislature had 
the authority to serve its interest in prohibiting sexual 
orientation discrimination in public accommodation 
law,75 even if sexual orientation received only rational 
basis—or, more likely after Bostock, intermediate scru-
tiny—in equal protection inquiries. Thus, to accept the 
exemption seekers’ argument about strict scrutiny—to 
analyze religious exemption claims differently depend-
ing on the individual relying on statutory protection 
based on an equal protection doctrine that is not impli-
cated—is to defy the Court’s declaration that public 
accommodation laws serve compelling government 
 
 73 Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1783 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 74 See Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 623. 
 75 See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of 
Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 572 (1995). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3691160
26 
 
interests, even where classes that do not receive strict 
scrutiny under equal protection are at issue.76 
 A second variation of this argument appears to be 
that the First Amendment claims being made by the 
exemption seekers requires strict scrutiny. That fact, 
coupled with the fact that race receives strict scrutiny, 
is urged as support for the argument that “race is just 
different.”77 Thus, the argument seems to be that be-
cause the free exercise claims and race both get strict 
scrutiny, the public accommodation law is not narrowly 
tailored in a way to survive the double strict scrutiny 
inquiry.78 However, because public accommodation 
laws are neutral laws of general applicability, they 
generally are considered under the rational basis test 
rather than the strict scrutiny test when challenged 
under the First Amendment.79 Indeed, when the Court 
 
 76 See generally Brief for Lawyers’ Committee for Civil 
Rights Under Law, supra note 60, at *18–19; Deborah A. Widiss, 
Intimate Liberties and Antidiscrimination Law, 97 B.U. L. REV. 
2083, 2128 (2017) (“The assumption that protection against 
marital status discrimination is less compelling than protection 
against discrimination on the basis of race or sex is deeply prob-
lematic.”). 
 77 See Brief for Freedom of Speech Scholars as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Respondents at 16 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. 
Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111), 2017 
WL 4876116, *16. 
 78 See id. 
 79 See Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 
(1990); see Brief of Amicus Curiae NAACP Legal Defense & Edu-
cational Fund, Inc. in Support of Respondents, Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 
(2018) (No. 16-111), 2017 WL 5127302 [hereinafter Brief of 
NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund]. 
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has “considered and rejected religious exemptions in 
the past, those precedents are not limited to the con-
text of racial discrimination simply because they orig-
inally arose in that context.”80 
 In sum, these arguments seeking to treat exemp-
tion claims against various antidiscrimination stat-
utes as receiving radically different constitutional 
analyses are flawed. The arguments conflate a govern-
ment’s compelling interest to combat discrimination in 
public accommodation with the level of scrutiny that 
applies in an equal protection claim.81 It is therefore 
“irrelevant whether government-sponsored sexual ori-
entation discrimination receives the same scrutiny as 
government-sponsored racial discrimination.”82 That is 
because the state interest in preventing discrimination 
is the appropriate interest to consider in evaluating 
any constitutional challenge to a public accommoda-
tion law, rather than the constitutional scrutiny that is 
afforded to governmental discrimination against those 
groups protected by the public accommodation law.83 
 
 
 80 Brief of NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, supra 
note 79, at 16. 
 81 See id. at 19; accord David B. Cruz, Piety and Prejudice: 
Free Exercise Exemption from Laws Prohibiting Sexual Orienta-
tion Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1176, 1186–89 & n.63 
(1994). 
 82 Brief for Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, 
supra note 60, at 19. 
 83 Brief of Amicus Curiae NAACP Legal Defense & Educa-
tional Fund, supra note 79, at *16-*19 and n.18. 
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III. The Race Analogy Is Useful in Resolving 
This Case 
 This Court can and should rely on the race analogy 
in resolving this case, but without recourse to distract-
ing invocations of whether a religious belief is “honor-
able” or grounded in “animus” because courts do not 
normatively interrogate religious beliefs before deter-
mining the applicability of antidiscrimination stat-
utes. Proceeding from this understanding, the plain 
language of the FPO (and similar state public accom-
modation laws) make the analogy to race and to 
Piggie Park appropriate, as this Court recognized in 
Masterpiece Cakeshop. This Court’s decision in Bostock 
adds force to the race analogy by its clear directive to 
privilege the plain language of a statute.84 The plain 
language of the FPO unambiguously lists sexual orien-
tation alongside race as equally within the statute’s 
protections. The discriminatory conduct proscribed by 
the FPO is equally prohibited regardless of whether a 
Black, heterosexual couple is turned away from a res-
taurant or whether a white, same-sex couple is turned 
away by CSS. Because the statute’s plain language is 
a straightforward command not to discriminate that 
creates no hierarchy of protections, discriminating 
based on sexual orientation is “just as intolerable as 
discrimination directed toward race, national origin, 
or religion.”85 “That intolerance of discrimination is not 
 
 84 Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1749. 
 85 Elane Photography v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 79–80 (N.M. 
2013) (Bosson, J., concurring) (rejecting a wedding photogra-
pher’s request for a religious exemption from the New Mexico  
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unreasonable and unwarranted.”86 As in Bostock, be-
cause “the meaning of the statute’s terms is plain, [a 
court’s] job is at an end.”87 
 Moreover, the principle behind antidiscrimination 
laws supports use of the race analogy in sexual orien-
tation religious exemption cases. The goal of public ac-
commodation laws is to preclude the perpetuation of 
unequal status hierarchies through discrimination in 
the marketplace. While all individuals are protected 
from the specified forms of discrimination, including 
LGBT people and people of color, the groups in the cur-
rent dispute and in the case law are similarly situated: 
the statute’s plain language protects these groups 
who are vulnerable to invidious discrimination in the 
public square.88 Although the historical, cultural, and 
political reasons for vulnerability to discrimination in 
the marketplace vary, the harms against which the 
statute seeks to protect is similar enough to support 
the analogy in this context—the stigmatic and eco-
nomic harm of discrimination in public accommoda-
tion.89 
 
public accommodation law that would allow the photographer to 
turn away same-sex couples). 
 86 MCCLAIN, WHO’S THE BIGOT?, supra note 10, at 154. 
 87 Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1749. 
 88 Sager & Tebbe, supra note 49, at 173 (“The central aim of 
civil rights law is to protect members of vulnerable groups from 
the harms of structural injustice; that vital project would be un-
dermined by a broad carve out for religious dissent.”). 
 89 See Russell, supra note 35, at 44; Roberts, 468 U.S. at 625. 
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 Because public accommodation law “does not take 
sides in a purported culture war”90 but instead “stipu-
lates what citizens who are divided on questions of 
profound importance nonetheless owe to each other in 
order to live together as equals in our political commu-
nity[,]”91 a statute’s unambiguous inclusion of both 
race and sexual orientation in a civil rights law ren-
ders analogies to race proper. The Court itself has 
declared that a state legislature’s decision to include 
LGBT people within its laws is a decision that the 
Court and the Constitution should recognize and up-
hold.92 
 In fact, this Court has analogized to race when 
analyzing a sex discrimination claim under federal 
antidiscrimination law that included both race and sex 
as protected classes. In City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 
the Court faced a class-action challenge made by 
women alleging that the Department of Water and 
Power’s requirement that female employees make 
larger contributions to its pension fund than male 
employees violated Title VII.93 While Title VII prohib-
its discrimination in employment and the FPO prohib-
its discrimination in public accommodation, both 
 
 90 Sager & Tebbe, supra note 49, at 173. 
 91 Id. at 173–74. 
 92 See Windsor, 570 U.S. at 768 (emphasizing that New 
York’s recognition of same-sex marriages was a proper use of its 
“historic and essential authority to define the marital relation in 
this way” and that this legislative decision “enhanced the recog-
nition, dignity, and protection of the class in their own commu-
nity”). 
 93 435 U.S. 702, 704–05 (1978). 
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statutes similarly enumerate numerous forms of dis-
crimination addressed by their protections—“race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin”94 for Title VII and 
“race, ethnicity, color, sex, sexual orientation, gender 
identity, religion, national origin, ancestry, disability, 
marital status, familial status, or domestic or sexual 
violence victim status”95 for the FPO. 
 The Manhart Court used the race analogy to sup-
port its decision that the city’s requirement was sex-
based discrimination in violation of Title VII: “Congress 
has decided that classifications based on sex, like 
those based on national origin or race, are unlawful.”96 
Because the Court found that the city’s pension rule 
would not be permissible as to race, it reasoned by 
analogy that it was not permissible as to sex.97 That 
the Court was comfortable with finding what might 
be termed “statutory sameness” between race and sex 
should dictate that the “statutory sameness” between 
sexual orientation and race is compelling in the present 
case. This is particularly true after Bostock: Because bans 
on sex-based discrimination ban sexual orientation-based 
discrimination, and because the Court analogizes race 
to sex, the Court therefore should analogize race to 
sexual orientation. After Bostock, then, there is a 
clear through-line from the acceptance of the sex-race 
 
 94 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 
 95 Philadelphia Code § 9-1106. 
 96 435 U.S. at 709. 
 97 Id. (“But a statute that was designed to make race irrele-
vant in the employment market could not reasonably be con-
strued to permit a take-home-pay differential based on a racial 
classification.”) (citation omitted). 
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analogy in both Manhart and Jaycees, to the subsum-
ing of sexual orientation discrimination under sex dis-
crimination in Bostock, to the sexual orientation-race 
analogy supporting the Respondents here. 
 The race analogy is thus appropriate in the con-
text of public accommodation statutes. To allow any 
other result would create incoherence in the law, disre-
gard the FPO’s plain language, and send a normative 
message that discrimination against LGBT consumers 
is natural, normal, and acceptable.98 
--------------------------------- ♦ --------------------------------- 
 
CONCLUSION 
 This country and this Court have considered and 
rejected claims for religious exemptions from public 
accommodation laws in similar contexts to the claims 
asserted by today’s exemption seekers. We do not need 
“new and expansive accommodations that depart sig-
nificantly from the ways in which the nation has in the 
past accommodated liberty considerations while seek-
ing to attain equality objectives in the context of race 
and gender.”99 This Court should look to what worked 
historically when similar challenges to antidiscrimina-
tion laws—in the context of race and sex—have been 
raised.100 Analogizing to race in the present dispute 
 
 98 See Tebbe, supra note 40, at 61–62. 
 99 Ball, supra note 3, at 238. 
 100 Id. at 245 (“In other words, there is no need to reinvent 
the exemption wheel. The bottom line is this: we should be suspi-
cious of the contention that the push for LGBT rights, in particu-
lar as it relates to marriage equality, constitutes a unique threat 
to religious liberty that requires significant departures from the  
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requires no improper governmental assessment of re-
ligious beliefs, just as courts made no such assessment 
in the 1960s. The race analogy, including an analogy 
to Piggie Park, should be used today and would not 
require an inquiry into Petitioners’ sincerely held reli-
gious beliefs. 
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